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I. INTRODUCTION
T HE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, through the Federal Avia-
tion Administration (FAA), promotes and regulates civil avi-
ation in the United States.' To accomplish this task, the FAA
* The author is an associate at the Butler, Galter & O'Brien Law Firm in Lin-
coln, Nebraska, where he practices aviation law and general commercial litiga-
tion. J. D., University of Nebraska College of Law; M.B.A., Western International
University.
See FRED A. BIEHLER, AVIATION MAINTENANCE LAw § 1 (1975).
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has promulgated a vast array of rules and procedures, called
Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs), which govern the certifica-
tion, maintenance, and operation of aircraft.2 Because a great
portion of these regulations are safety-oriented, aviation insur-
ance policies have come to incorporate one or more provisions
that exclude coverage if the aircraft is being operated in viola-
tion of FARs.3 Unfortunately, the FARs are so broad and com-
prehensive that an accident is very unlikely to occur without
either the pilot or the aircraft being in violation of at least one
of these regulations.4
For cases in which the violation clearly caused or contributed
to the loss, little needs to be said regarding the validity of such
policy provisions. However, for cases in which the loss is com-
pletely unattributable to the violation, forfeiture of coverage
seems to be an unjust result.5 A recent South Dakota case illus-
trates this issue.6
In that case, the pilot, while flying a small single-engine air-
craft, had an accident solely due to pilot error.7 Although no
one was injured in the accident, the aircraft was totally de-
stroyed. The insurance company denied coverage on the ensu-
ing claim because the pilot did not have a current medical
certificate' at the time of the accident, as required by the pol-
icy.9 Even though the pilot's health in no way contributed to
the accident, as evidenced by a medical certificate issued four
2 See Noralyn 0. Harlow, Annotation, Aviation Insurance: Causal Link Between
Breach of Policy Provisions and Accident as Requisite to Avoid Insurer's Liability, 48
A.L.R. 4th 778, 782 (1986) (citing 8 Am. JUR. 2D, Aviation §§ 9-12, 21-26, 34-36
(1964)).
3 See id. at 782-83 (citing Thompson v. Ezell, 379 P.2d 983 (Wash. 1963) and
SPEISER, AvIATION TORT LAW § 29:27 (1980)); see also Timothy Mark Bates, Avia-
tion Insurance Exclusions-Should a Causal Connection Between the Loss and Exclusion
Be Required to Deny Coverage?, 52J. AIR L. & COM. 451, 454-61 (1986) (explaining
the history and development of aviation insurance).
4 See Harlow, supra note 2, at 783 (citing Thompson v. Ezell, 379 P.2d 983
(Wash. 1963) and SPEISER, AVIATION TORT LAw § 29:27 (1980)).
5 Courts in several states have not allowed aircraft insurers to deny coverage
when the breach of a policy provision did not contribute to the loss. See infra
note 14.
6 See Economic Aero Club, Inc. v. Avemco Ins. Co., 540 N.W.2d 644 (S.D.
1995).
7 See id. at 645.
8 See infra note 81 and accompanying text (explaining the purpose and classifi-
cation of medical certificates).
9 The pilot did hold a third-class medical certificate, although it had expired
on July 18, 1990. The accident occurred approximately four months later on
November 25, 1990. See Economic Aero Club, 540 N.W.2d at 645.
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days later,10 the court upheld the exclusion and denied
coverage."
Although the regulation requiring all pilots to possess a cur-
rent medical certificate is nationwide, the effect that not having
such a certificate has upon insurance coverage varies drastically
depending upon the jurisdiction where the issue is litigated. 12
Even though most policies contain such provisions, a growing
number of states will not effectuate the provision if the violation
did not contribute to the loss.
At the time of this writing, eight states compose the faction
representing this modern trend.13 Those states are Colorado,
Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Mississippi, Montana, Texas, and South
Carolina. 4 As will be detailed later in this Article, some of these
states negate the exclusionary provisions by applying anti-techni-
10 See id.
11 See id. at 646.
12 See Dawn R. Gabel, Warranties and Representations in Aviation Insurance: A Con-
tribute-to-the-Loss Solution to the Confusion Created by the Common Law and the Statutory
Response, 30 ARIz. L. Pv. 515 (1988). This Article will not attempt to address the
choice of law and conflict of law issues that arise in determining where an aircraft
insurance case should be litigated and which state's law should be applied.
13 Some commentators have characterized the causal connection requirement
as the "modern trend." Puckett v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 678 S.W.2d 936,
937 (Tex. 1984). One court responded that "[w]hether this is the modern trend
is debatable, as evidenced by the authority cited above. We do believe, however,
that it is the better rule to require causation." Id. at 938.
14 See Bayers v. Omni Aviation Managers, 510 F. Supp. 1204 (D. Mont. 1981)
(holding that a causal connection was required between pilot's failure to have
medical certificate and the loss before the insurer could deny coverage); Ameri-
can States Ins. Co. v. Byerly Aviation, Inc., 456 F. Supp 967 (S.D. Ill. 1978) (hold-
ing that the insurer could not deny coverage despite the fact that an unnamed
pilot flew the aircraft absent showing the breach contributed to the loss); Avemco
Ins. Co. v. Chung, 388 F. Supp. 142 (D. Haw. 1975) (holding that the insured's
failure to possess a current medical certificate would not void coverage unless the
failure caused the loss); Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. McDaniel, 187 F. Supp. 614
(N.D. Miss. 1960) (holding that the insurer could not deny coverage unless the
insured's failure to have pilot license contributed to loss), affid per curiam, 289
F.2d 926 (5th Cir. 1961); O'Connor v. Proprietors Ins. Co., 696 P.2d 282 (Colo.
1985) (upholding a policy exclusion denying coverage for a lack of annual in-
spection because the insured did not prove that such failure was unrelated to the
cause of the accident); Pickett v. Woods, 404 So. 2d 1152, (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1981) (holding that the insurer could not deny coverage for lack of annual in-
spection when the cause of the accident was pilot error); South Carolina Ins. Co.
v. Collins, 237 S.E.2d 358 (S.C. 1977) (holding that coverage cannot be denied
when no causal connection exists between the accident and the insured's lack of
a medical certificate); Puckett v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 678 S.W.2d 936 (Tex.
1984) (holding that the insurer could not use the lack of an annual inspection to
deny coverage unless it was causally connected to the loss).
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cal statutes, while other states do so solely through common
law. 15
This Article begins with an explanation of various insurance
policy provisions and how underwriters have used them to limit
the risks for which liability is assumed. Part II focuses specifi-
cally on aircraft insurance policies and the various provisions
contained therein. Some of the more common policy exclu-
sions are described along with the purpose these exclusions
serve in the aviation context. The following part explores sev-
eral recent cases in which technical breaches of aircraft policies
precluded coverage even though the breaches did not contrib-
ute to the losses. The seemingly unfair results of these cases are
then contrasted with cases in which the courts employed a con-
tribute-to-the-loss standard. This approach provided coverage
in cases where the breach was proven to be totally unrelated to
the loss and denied coverage in those instances where that issue
could not be proven. Finally, in conclusion, this Article argues
that the contribute-to-the-loss approach is the fairest method for
dealing with technical breaches of aircraft policies. This ap-
proach continues to recognize the insurer's interests, while at
the same time advancing the public policy interest of providing
coverage for insureds.
II. INSURANCE POLICY PROVISIONS
The majority of the chaos over aviation insurance coverage
begins with the labels given various provisions within the policy
that propose to describe exactly what will and will not be cov-
ered.16 Because the labels given to various provisions can have a
dramatic effect on whether coverage will be allowed, some of
the basic distinctions between representations, warranties, and
exclusions merit discussion.
A. REPRESENTATIONS
In the insurance context, a representation is generally a writ-
ten or oral statement, not contained in the contract, by an appli-
cant for insurance that induces the insurer to enter into a
contract with the applicant. 7 The insurer may use the appli-
cant's representations to determine the amount of premium to
15 See Gabel, supra note 12, at 521-31.
16 See id. at 515.
17 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1301 (6th ed. 1990). A representation in the
insurance context is further defined as:
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be charged, the circumstances under which coverage will be
provided, or if coverage will be extended at all. 8
For cases in which the applicant has fraudulently made mate-
rial misrepresentations, 9 courts have held that the insurer is not
liable for the loss. 20 Even if the misrepresentation was not made
fraudulently, courts have still denied coverage if the insurer can
prove that the false information was material and that the in-
surer relied upon it to extend coverage. 21
Conversely, courts have been disinclined to grant insurers re-
lief for immaterial misrepresentations, irrespective of whether
the information was given fraudulently or by innocent mistake.22
Additionally, some states have enacted legislation to prevent the
harsh result of coverage forfeiture when the misrepresentation,
although material, in no way contributed to the loss. 23
The bulk of the representations made for aviation policies are
in the form of an aircraft owner's application for insurance.
These applications request information regarding total hours
A collateral statement, either by writing not inserted in the policy
or by parol, of such facts or circumstances, relative to the proposed
adventure, as are necessary to be communicated to the underwrit-
ers, to enable them to form a just estimate of the risks. The allega-
tion of any facts, by the applicant to the insurer, or vice versa,
preliminary to making the contract, and directly bearing upon it,
having a plain and evident tendency to induce the making of the
policy. The statements may or may not be in writing, and may be
either express or by obvious implication.
Id.
18 See ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAw § 5.7, at 567 (1988).
19 A fact is material when "it would so increase the degree or character of the
risk of the insurance so as to substantially influence its issuance, or substantially
affect the rate of premium." Id. at 571 n.17 (quoting Davis-Scofield v. Agricultural
Ins. Co., 145 A. 38, 40 (Conn. 1929)).
20 See KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 18, at 571.
21 When the following three elements are found, the court has a clear basis to
either rescind the contract or allow the insurer's affirmative defense to the claim:
An insurer is entitled to relief on the basis that an insured provided
incorrect information in an insurance application, when it is
proved: (1) that the information was not correct; (2) that the infor-
mation received was important either to the insurer's decision to
insure or to the terms of the insurance contract, (that is, the infor-
mation was "material"); and (3) that the insurer in fact relied on
the incorrect information.
Id. at 570 (quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Price, 396 N.E.2d 134, 136
(Ind. Ct. App. 1979). See also Crawford v. Standard Ins. Co., 621 P.2d 583 (Or. Ct.
App. 1980).
22 See id. at 571.
23 See id. at 572.
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flown and a breakdown of the types of aircraft flown, as well as
the hours in each. The applications also request the certificates
and ratings held by the pilot.24
B. WARRANTIES
When representations are incorporated into the insurance
contract, they are generally referred to as warranties. Common
law characterized warranties as statements or factual descrip-
tions that were incorporated into the policy, related to an in-
sured risk, and were to be literally true or coverage could be
denied. 25 Through the years, using warranties in insurance con-
tracts as conditions precedent to the payment of claims, along
with the requirement of literal satisfaction for even the most triv-
ial of provisions, became very widespread .2  By merely charac-
terizing every representation as a warranty, insurers were able to
avoid paying claims by simply finding a minute discrepancy be-
tween the facts and the representations.2 7 This happened so fre-
quently that judges became very upset with insurers who
attempted to impose such forfeitures upon unsuspecting in-
sureds through the use of warrantees regarding unrelated issues.
Thus, courts began to construe policy language against the in-
surer, even to the point of distortion.28
24 See, e.g., Eastern Aviation & Marine Underwriters, Inc. v. Gilbertson, 379
N.W.2d 567, 570 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985); Ideal Mut. Ins. Co. v. Last Days Evangeli-
cal Ass'n, 783 F.2d 1234, 1237 (5th Cir. 1986).
25 See KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 18, at 568.
26 The courts were eventually called upon to intervene on behalf of
policyholders:
The effect of such warranty provisions was increasingly tojeopard-
ize the rights of policyholders, no matter how honest and careful
they were [in providing information]. As the use of warranties-
together with the rule requiring literal satisfaction-was brought to
bear on an increasingly large portion of all insured transactions, it
led to numerous lawsuits which called upon the courts to consider
whether the failure to satisfy what was urged, on behalf of claim-
ants, to be an immaterial warranty should preclude all rights of an
insured to coverage.
Id. at 564-65.
27 See id. at 564.
28 The judicial response to many of these warranty provisions was to construe,
and sometimes even distort, the policies, language to favor the insureds. This
"resulted in a mass of litigation and confused precedent, the like of which cannot
be found in any other field of our law." Id. at 565 (quoting William R. Vance, The
History of the Development of the Warranty in Insurance Law, 20 YALE L.J. 523, 534
(1911)).
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Today, both legislation and judicial decisions have lessened
the harsh effect of some of these warranties. The most common
type of statute dealing with this issue limits those statements in a
policy that can be construed as warranties, rendering those that
do not qualify as mere representations. A majority of the states
have enacted these contribute-to-the-risk statutes that provide
that a misrepresentation will not void coverage unless the mis-
representation was made fraudulently, was material to the ac-
ceptance of the risk, or would have caused the insurer not to
issue the policy had the insurer known of the misrepresenta-
tion.29 Furthermore, some states passed anti-technical statutes
with contribute-to-the-loss provisions, which prevent an insurer
from denying coverage despite a breached condition by the in-
sured, unless that breach was causally related to the loss. 0
C. EXCLUSIONS
An exclusion in insurance parlance has been defined as a pol-
icy provision that eliminates coverage for certain persons, situa-
tions, or circumstances, when it would otherwise exist but for
the exclusion.31 Therefore, exclusions are fundamentally differ-
ent from representations, warranties, and conditions, in that
they are not promises by either the insurer or the insured, but
rather statements of what events or uses are outside the bounda-
ries of coverage.32 One of the effects of listing policy provisions
as exclusions rather than warranties has been to circumvent the
materiality and contribute-to-the-loss issues detailed above. By
simply labeling what would normally be a warranty as an exclu-
sion, insurers can claim that enforcement of the provision does
not forfeit coverage because coverage never existed for the ex-
cluded event.33
Exclusions routinely found in aircraft policies deal with pilot
qualifications and certification of both pilot and aircraft. Such
provisions, for example, will exclude coverage if a loss occurs
- See Gabel, supra note 12, at 521.
30 See Harlow, supra note 2, at 783.
31 See BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 563 (6th ed. 1990).
32 See Bates, supra note 3, at 463.
33 See Security Ins. Co. v. Andersen, 763 P.2d 246, 250 (Ariz. 1988). In that
case, the court stated that an exclusion is quantitatively different than a condition
precedent. Forfeiture of the very thing paid for because of a failure to strictly
comply with a condition precedent is disfavored by courts. However, an opera-
tive exclusion does not involve a forfeiture because no coverage ever existed for
the excluded event. See id.
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while the aircraft is being operated in violation of its airworthi-
ness certificate34 or "if piloted by a person not properly certifi-
cated, rated, and qualified under the current applicable Federal
Air Regulations for the operation involved."35
As evidenced by the examples in the previous section, the la-
bels given to various policy provisions often determine the out-
come of coverage disputes. 6  Most states seem to have
addressed, either through case law or legislation, the most fla-
grant insurer abuses of strict adherence to representations and
warranties to avoid the payment of legitimate claims. However,
similar policy provisions denoted as exclusions, having some of
the same harsh effects, have for the most part eluded both judi-
cial and legislative oversight.3 7 For that reason, the effect and
treatment of policy exclusions will be the primary focus of this
note.
III. JUSTIFICATION FOR EXCLUSIONS
Insurance companies rightfully have the ability to limit the
risk that they assume by virtue of the insurance contract.3 8
Therefore, aviation policies usually contain numerous exclu-
34 See, e.g., Monarch Ins. Co. v. Polytech Indus., 655 F.Supp. 1058, 1060 (M.D.
Ga. 1987).
35 Security Ins. Co., 763 P.2d at 248.
36 See Gabel, supra note 12, at 520-21. The terms used to describe various pol-
icy provisions can have a dramatic impact on the insured's coverage as indicated
in the following passage:
The outcome of a case very often hinges upon which of these terms
a court focuses on when determining the treatment of the particu-
lar policy provision in question. The consequences range in sever-
ity from complete forfeiture for breach of a coverage provision; to
possible forfeiture if the breach of a warranty, sometimes treated as
a representation by statutory authority, contributes to the risk as-
sumed; to possible forfeiture for breach which contributes to the
actual loss; to non-forfeiture for a misrepresentation which was
either not material or not fraudulently made.
Id. (citations omitted)
37 Because none of the statutes dealing with insurance provisions expressly in-
clude exclusions, most states do not require a causal connection between the
exclusion and the loss for the insurer to deny coverage. See Bates, supra note 3, at
465. However, one state appellate court held that an insurer should not be able
to circumvent anti-technical statutes and thereby deny coverage by simply in-
serting a condition in a policy and calling it an exclusion. Global Aviation Ins. Man-
agers v. Lees, 368 N.W.2d 209, 212 (Iowa Ct. App. 1985) (emphasis added).
38 See National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Estate of Meyer, 237 Cal. Rptr. 632, 635
(Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (citing National Ins. Underwriters v. Carter, 551 P.2d 362
(Cal. 1976)).
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sions39 that deny coverage when the insured engages in certain
types of operations that are likely to increase the insurer's risk of
loss.4" The following are some of the more common exclusions
found in aircraft policies that have given rise to litigation.
A. USE OF AIRCRAFr
Aircraft insurance policies sometimes contain exclusions for
aerobatic flights.4 Aerobatic flight is defined as "an intentional
maneuver involving an abrupt change in an aircraft's attitude,
an abnormal attitude, or abnormal acceleration, not necessary
for normal flight."4 Due to the nature of these maneuvers, reg-
ulations further require that occupants engaged in aerobatic
flight maneuvers wear parachutes.43
Understandably, courts have upheld policy provisions exclud-
ing coverage for aircraft that sustain a loss while performing aer-
obatic maneuvers and have not required the insurers to prove a
causal connection between the breach of the policy provision
and the loss.44
Policies also usually contain exclusions for aircraft that suffer
a loss while being used for an unlawful purpose, during conver-
sion, or while carrying explosives.4" Likewise, courts have given
effect to such provisions and denied coverage without requiring
the insurer to prove a causal connection between the policy
breach and the loss. 4
6
Because these provisions go directly to the intentional use of
the aircraft, courts have been inclined to uphold provisions
which allow insurers to exclude coverage for operations which
tend to increase the risk of loss.
39 See, e.g., Harlow, supra note 2 (explaining various aircraft policy exclusions
and how the courts have applied them).
40 See id. at 782-83.
41 See id. at 790.
42 14 C.F.R. § 91.303 (1998).
43 The FARs stipulate that "[u] nless each occupant of the aircraft is wearing an
approved parachute, no pilot of a civil aircraft carrying any person (other than a
crewmember) may execute any intentional maneuver that exceeds- (1) A bank
of 60 degrees relative to the horizon; or (2) A nose-up or nose-down attitude of
30 degrees relative to the horizon." 14 C.F.R. § 91.307(c) (1998) (emphasis
added).
4 See Harlow, supra note 2, at 790-91 (summarizing Globe Indem. Co. v. Han-
sen, 231 F.2d 895 (Minn. Ct. App. 1956) and Bruce v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas.
Co., 222 F.2d 642 (N.C. Ct. App. 1955)).
45 See id. at 791-93.
46 See id.
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B. TYPE OF AIRCRAFT
In addition to hull coverage, aircraft insurance policies often
provide coverage for personal injuries that occur while the in-
sured is an occupant of a "non-owned" aircraft. As the following
case indicates, however, this type of coverage is limited to those
aircraft having a "Standard" Airworthiness Certificate, as op-
posed to an "Experimental" or "Special" Airworthiness
Certificate.47
The Oklahoma Supreme Court, in Avemco Insurance Co. v.
White,48 denied coverage under a nonowned aircraft policy pro-
vision that excluded any loss that occurred in an aircraft that
lacked a "Standard" Category Airworthiness Certificate.49 In
that case, the insured and his passenger were both killed while
flying an aircraft that had been issued an Experimental Airwor-
thiness Certificate.5 ° White's estate later sought indemnification
for a negligence suit the passenger's estate brought against it.
In recognizing the insurer's right to place valid limits on its risk,
the court stated that the exclusion was not contrary to public
policy because " [ t] he risk of an accident while flying an airplane
without a 'Standard' Airworthiness Certificate is clearly greater
than the risk of an accident while flying an aircraft with one."51
Similarly, in United States Aviation Underwriters, Inc. v. Sunray
Airline, Inc.,52 the court denied nonowned aircraft coverage by
upholding a policy exclusion for losses that occur in a turbine-
powered aircraft.5 3 In that case an accident occurred while a
pilot for the insured was flying a turbine-powered aircraft that
47 "Standard Airworthiness Certificates are issued for airplanes type certifi-
cated in the normal, utility, acrobatic or transport categories. If the airplane is
new and manufactured under a Production Certificate, no further inspection is
required for issuance . . . . Experimental Certificates are issued for newly
designed, modified, or equipped airplanes." BIEHLER, supra note 1, § 18, at 28-
29. "Special Airworthiness Certificates may be issued for airplanes of non-stan-
dard design, military surplus, of a new type, or malfunctioning or damaged air-
planes needing to be flown to a place where repairs can be accomplished." Id. at
29.
48 841 P.2d 588 (Okla. 1992).
49 See id. at 589; see infra notes 60, 62 (explaining requirements for and dura-
tion of standard airworthiness certificates).
50 SeeAvemco Ins. Co., 841 P.2d. at 589; 14 C.F.R. § 91307(c) supra note 43(ex-
plaining the requirements for experimental airworthiness certificates).
51 See Avemco Ins. Co., 841 P.2d at 591.
52 543 So.2d 1309 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
53 See id. at 1312.
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the insured did not own.54 When a passenger brought suit
against the insured for injuries suffered, the court upheld the
provision stating that losses involving turbine-powered aircraft,
helicopters, and seaplanes were all clearly excluded from the
policy from its inception.5 Despite claims by the insured that
the design of the engines did not contribute to the crash, the
court reasoned that the cause was irrelevant because coverage
under the policy never existed for that type of aircraft.56 Further,
the court added that a distinction can be drawn between that
case and instances when an insured aircraft might remain cov-
ered despite the breach of the policy for flying the aircraft after
the annual inspection has expired. In those cases, because the
aircraft was covered initially, if the breach of the policy provision
requiring current inspections does not contribute to the loss,
coverage would still be available.57
C. AIRCRAFr AIRWORTHINESS
Another common exclusion found in aircraft policies relates
to the aircraft's airworthiness certificate.5 ' The FAA normally
issues a standard airworthiness certificate at the time the aircraft
is manufactured. 59 FARs not only require that the certificate re-
main in the aircraft, but also that it be displayed in a conspicu-
ous manner for all passengers and crew.60 Although the actual
airworthiness certificate remains unchanged, it is not consid-
ered current and in force if an annual inspection 61 has not been
54 See id. at 1310. The aircraft in that case crashed as a result of fuel starvation.
See id.
55 See id. at 1312.
56 See id. at 1310-11.
57 See id. at 1311-12 (distinguishing Pickett v. Woods, 404 So. 2d 1152 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1981)).
58 See Harlow, supra note 2, at 785.
59 See BIEHLER, supra note 1, §§ 17-18.
60 The FARs provide that "no person may operate a civil aircraft unless it
has . . . [an appropriate and current airworthiness certificate." 14 C.F.R.
§ 91.203(a) (1) (1998) (emphasis added). The regulations further provide that
"[n] o person may operate a civil aircraft unless the airworthiness certificate... is
displayed at the cabin or cockpit entrance so that it is legible to passengers or
crew." 14 C.F.R. § 91.203(b) (1998).
61 An annual inspection is accomplished by first removing all aircraft access
panels and inspection plates to facilitate a methodical, visual inspection to deter-
mine the aircraft's structural integrity. All components and systems are opera-
tionally checked as are critical dimensional tolerances. Compression tests are
performed on combustion engines to ascertain performance and/or detect possi-
ble malfunctions. All fuel, oil, hydraulic, air, vacuum, filters, and screens are
either cleaned or replaced. See, e.g., 14 C.F.R. pt. 43, App. D (1998) for a com-
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completed on the aircraft within the preceding twelve months.62
Because these airworthiness regulations are clearly safety-re-
lated,63 insurers would understandably want to exclude coverage
for losses occurring as a result of aircraft not being in compli-
ance with these regulations.64
In Monarch Insurance Co. v. Polytech Industry, Inc.,65 coverage
was denied due in part to the lack of a current annual inspec-
tion. 6 In that case, the aircraft, which had not been flown for
several months, crashed shortly after takeoff thereby destroying
the aircraft and injuring all four occupants.67 In upholding the
policy exclusion, the court reasoned that the annual inspection
requirement "was obviously designed to protect the insurer
from liability for accidents caused by the operation of an unsafe
plane."68 The court added that denying coverage did not violate
public policy, not only because the cause of the accident had
not been determined, but also because the violation of the FAR
inspection requirement relates directly to the safe operation of
the aircraft.69
plete enumeration of the scope and detail of an annual inspection. Further-
more, an annual inspection can only be performed by an airframe and
powerplant mechanic with an FAA Inspection Authorization or by an FAA ap-
proved Certified Repair Station. See 14 C.F.R. §§ 65.85, 65.87, 91.409 (1998).
62 The FARs provide that "Standard Airworthiness Certificates remain in effect
indefinitely so long as the airplane is maintained in accordance with FAR 43 and
FAR 91, unless sooner suspended or revoked by the FAA for some reason."
BIEHLER, supra note 1, § 18, at 29. Part 91 also provides that an aircraft may not
be operated unless an annual inspection has been performed within the preced-
ing twelve months. See 14 C.F.R. § 91.409 (a)(1) (1998).
63 See generally BIEHLER, supra note 1, § 13, at 23 (quoting Section 601 of the
Federal Aviation Act of 1958).
4 See, e.g., Monarch Ins. Co. v. Polytech Indus. Inc., 655 F. Supp. 1058, 1062
(M.D. Ga. 1987); see also Harlow, supra note 2, 785-90 (summarizing additional
cases dealing with the denial of coverage due to the lack of a valid airworthiness
certificate).
65 655 F. Supp. 1058 (M.D. Ga. 1987).
66 See id. at 1060. In addition, the pilot did not have a current medical certifi-
cate nor a biennial flight review as required by the FARs and the insurance pol-
icy. See id. at 1060-61. See infra note 97 (setting out requirements for flight
reviews).
67 See Monarch Ins. Co. 655 F. Supp at 1059-60.
68 Id. at 1062.
69 See id. (citing O'Connor v. Proprietors Ins. Co., 696 P.2d 282, 285 (Colo.
1985)).
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D. PILOT CERTIFICATION AND QUALIFICATIONS
The following cases explain how the pilots' adherence to Fed-
eral Aviation Regulations is incorporated into aircraft insurance
policy provisions to limit the risk the insurer assumed. For ex-
ample, the FARs place many limitations on the flight operations
that student pilots may conduct.7 1 One such limitation is the
absolute prohibition against carrying passengers v.7  Therefore,
aircraft insurance policies contain provisions that deny coverage
if the student pilot violates this regulation or in any way goes
beyond those operations the instructor authorizes. 2
In Eastern Aviation and Marine Underwriters, Inc. v. Gilbertson,7' a
student pilot crashed the airplane he was flying during a landing
attempt.74 Contrary to the FARs, the student was carrying a pas-
senger who was injured as a result of the accident.75 The insurer
denied coverage because the student pilot had operated the air-
craft in a manner his instructor had not authorized, which was
an excluded use under the policy.76 Naturally, the court sided
with the insurer and held that because the student pilot had not
met the requirements of the policy, the flight was outside the
scope of coverage. 7
Moreover, in United States Fire Insurance Co. v. West Monroe
Charter Service, Inc.,7s the Louisiana Court of Appeals upheld a
policy provision 79 excluding coverage if the pilot did not have a
current medical certificate."0 A medical certificate81 is required
7. See 14 C.F.R. §§ 61.87, 61.89 (1998).
71 See 14 C.F.R. § 61.89 (a)(1) (1998).
72 See, e.g., Eastern Aviation and Marine Underwriters, Inc. v. Gilbertson, 379
N.W.2d 567, 568 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
73 See id.
74 See id. at 569.
75 See id.
76 See id. at 568. The applicable policy provision stated that "none of the cover-
ages apply unless [the student] pilot is accompanied by, or has received prior
flight approval and briefing from a [certified flight instructor]." Id.
77 See id. at 570.
78 504 So. 2d 93 (La. Ct. App. 1987).
79 The policy contained the following language:
The aircraft must be operated in flight only by a person shown be-
low who must have a current and proper (1) medical certificate
and (2) pilot certificate with necessary ratings, as required by the
FAA for each flight. There is no coverage under the policy if the
pilot does not meet these requirements.
Id. at 99 (emphasis added).
80 See id.
81 The FARs define a medical certificate is defined in the FARs as "acceptable
evidence of physical fitness on a form prescribed by the Administrator." 14
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by the FARs to ensure that a pilot does not have a health condi-
tion that will interfere with his ability to operate an aircraft
safely.12 In that case the pilot and his three passengers died in a
crash that occurred during a flight in which the pilot's medical
certificate had expired. 3 In denying coverage, however, the
court noted that the pilot not only failed to possess a current
medical certificate, but that there was strong evidence that he
would not have been able to obtain one had he tried, due to a
high blood pressure condition for which he was being treated at
the time. 4
In Schneider Leasing, Inc. v. United States Aviation Undenrriters,
Inc., 5 the insurer denied coverage for an accident because the
pilot did not have a commercial license, instrument rating, 6 or
the minimum number of flight hours, all of which the policy re-
C.F.R. § 1.1 (1998). There are three classes of medical certificates: first, second,
and third-class certificates. The first-class certificate has the most stringent medi-
cal standards and is therefore required for airline transport pilots. The duration
of the first-class certificate is six months. The second-class certificate has a
slightly less stringent medical standard and is valid for one year. Second-class
certificates are required for any commercial pilot flying for hire such as in-
structing, crop-spraying, charter, etc. Third-class certificates have the least strin-
gent medical standards and are required for private pilots. The duration of
third-class certificates is two years. See, e.g., 14 C.F.R. § 67 (1998) (defining the
medical standards and procedures for certification of airmen).
82 For a third-class certificate to be issued, the FARs require that thepilot have
no condition that:
1) Makes the person unable to safely perform the duties or exercise
the privileges of the airman certificate applied for or held; or
2) May reasonably be expected, for the maximum duration of the
airman medical certificate applied for or held, to make the person
unable to perform those duties or exercise those privileges.
14 C.F.R. § 67.313(b) (1998).
83 See United States Fire Ins. Co., 504 So. 2d at 95, 98.
84 The pilot's last medical certificate was issued on May 26, 1976. See id. at 96.
Basically, a third-class medical certificate is valid for 24 months. The FARs state
that a third-class medical certificate expires at the end of the 24th month follow-
ing the month of the examination date. 14 C.F.R. § 61.23 (c) (1998). The certif-
icate in that case would, therefore, have expired on May 31, 1978. The accident
at issue occurred over three years later on July 1, 1981. See United States Fire Ins.
Co., 504 So. 2d at 93, 95 (La. Ct. App. 1987). After the medical certificate ex-
pired, the pilot was found to be suffering from high blood pressure and had even
been hospitalized for treatment in May 1979. See id. at 96. Dr. N. R. Spencer, a
local designated medical examiner who provides medical examinations to pilots,
testified that the pilot would have been denied a medical certificate based upon
the medication he was taking to control his high blood pressure. See id. at 97.
85 555 N.W.2d 838 (Iowa 1996).
86 See infra notes 172-73.
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quired.8 7 In that case, the pilot and a passenger were killed
when the aircraft crashed shortly after takeoff.8 8 Although that
state had an anti-technical statute, the court refused to impose a
contribute-to-the-loss standard to the insured's claim. The court
stated that the statute only applied to technical "conditions" or
"stipulations" that work to void coverage before the loss occurs
and not coverages excluded from inception.8 9 Thus, because the
pilot never met the requirements of the policy, the court held
that no coverage existed before the loss occurred.90
The court further criticized an earlier Iowa Court of Appeals
decision, Global Aviation Insurance Managers v. Lee,"' in which
that court used a contribute-to-the-loss standard to provide cov-
erage despite violations of two policy exclusions.9 2 In Global, the
appellate court held that the term "stipulation" in the statute
was not a term of art in the insurance industry, and thus was
broad enough to encompass not only warranties, but also exclu-
sions." Despite the additional public policy arguments that the
appellate court advanced,94  the Iowa Supreme Court
disagreed. 5
In light of these cases, policy exclusions can serve the valid
purposes of limiting an insurer's risk and encouraging the in-
sured to comply with safety regulations. The cases in the follow-
ing section, however, portray some completely arbitrary results
87 See Schneider Leasing 555 N.W.2d at 839-40. The aircraft involved in this case
was a twin-engine Beechcraft Baron. The policy's open pilot clause required a
minimum of 350 hours experience for a pilot in command of a multiengine air-
craft, in addition to a commercial license with an instrument rating. The pilot
flying the aircraft when the accident occurred had only 93 of the required 350
multiengine hours. See id.
88 See id. at 839. Although vehemently contested, various explanations were
offered regarding the accident's cause, including pilot error, mechanical mal-
function, and passenger interference. See id.
89 See id. at 842.
90 See id.
91 368 N.W.2d 209 (Iowa Ct. App. 1985).
92 See id. at 212. The insured lacked a valid medical certificate. In addition,
the aircraft airworthiness certificate was not in force. The cause of the accident,
however, was pilot error, because the pilot misjudged his speed and distance
while attempting to land on a wet grass strip. See id. at 210.
93 See id. at 211.
94 See id. at 212. The appellate court also stated that the purpose of the statute
was best served by applying it to all provisions of policies, however labeled by the
insurer, otherwise an insurer could circumvent the statute by inserting any condi-
tion in the policy and call it an "exclusion." See id.
95 See Schneider Leasing, 555 N.W.2d at 842.
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when the exclusions actually deny coverage for what amounts to
nothing more than a technical breach of the policy.
IV. TECHNICAL BREACH OF POLICY PROVISION
In contrast to the previous cases, aircraft accidents have oc-
curred in which, although the insured violated policy provisions,
the breach was completely unrelated to the loss. The following
cases provide insight into the substantial unfairness of denying
coverage when the technical policy breaches do not prejudice
the insurer's interests.
In Economic Aero Club, Inc. v. Avemco Insurance Co.,96 a licensed
private pilot, who was current and had met all recency require-
ments, 97 had an accident solely due to pilot error while flying a
small single-engine aircraft.9" Fortunately, no one was injured
in the accident, although the aircraft was a total loss. 9 The in-
surance company denied coverage on the subsequent claim for
recovery because the pilot did not have the current medical cer-
tificate required by the policy at the time of the accident. 100
Although the pilot's health did not contribute to the accident,
as evidenced by his being issued a medical certificate four days
later,10 1 the court nevertheless upheld the exclusion and denied
coverage. 102
That case, however, was one of first impression and the state
legislature had not enacted an anti-technical statute.1 0 3 The
court mentioned that other courts had adopted contribute-to-
the-loss standards absent such a statute on public policy
96 540 N.W.2d 644 (S.D. 1995).
97 See id. at 645. In addition to a valid pilot's license and a current medical
certificate, a pilot must meet several other requirements. The FARs mandate that
a pilot have a Flight Review every two years. See 14 C.F.R. § 61.56(c) (1998). Dur-
ing the Flight Review, the pilot must satisfactorily demonstrate to a certified flight
instructor that the pilot possesses the required level of knowledge and skill to
operate the aircraft safely. See 14 C.F.R. § 61.56(a) (1998). In addition, for a
pilot to carry passengers, he must have made three takeoffs and landings in a
similar aircraft within the preceding 90 days. See 14 C.F.R. § 61.57(c) (1998).
98 See Economic Aero Club, 540 N.W.2d at 645.
99 See id.
100 The pilot held a third-class medical certificate that had expired on July 18,
1990. The accident occurred four months later on November 25, 1990. See id.
See also supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text (setting out the purpose and
requirements for medical certificates).
101 See Economic Aero Club, 540 N.W. 2d at 645.
102 See id. at 646.
103 See id.
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grounds, but stated that it preferred to leave the matter to the
legislature. 10
4
The pilot in National Union Fire Insurance Co. v. Estate of
Meyer1°5 was likewise flying with an expired medical certificate.
Unfortunately, the accident that occurred in Meyer had much
more tragic results; the pilot and both passengers were killed. 1 6
Although the California Court of Appeals acknowledged that pi-
lot error was the sole cause of the accident, the court upheld the
policy provision excluding coverage for lack of a medical certifi-
cate and denied coverage. 10 7 In reversing the trial court, which
had provided coverage, the appellate court reasoned that no
precedent existed upon which it could impose a causal connec-
tion requirement; thus the policy had to be interpreted by its
plain language.108
Similarly, in Security Insurance Co. of Hartford v. Andersen,1 °9 the
court denied coverage for an accident claim involving a pilot
who did not have a current medical certificate, despite the fact
that no evidence was presented to prove the accident was health-
related. 01 In Security Insurance, the Arizona Supreme Court re-
versed an appellate court decision. 1 that had allowed coverage
by following the modern trend, which requires a causal connec-
tion between the breach of a policy provision and the loss. 11 2
The appellate court had stated that many prior decisions held
that courts would "not enforce what amount to arbitrary forfeit-
ures of insurance coverage for purely technical reasons beyond
those necessary to protect the insurers' legitimate interests. 113
The Arizona Supreme Court, in overruling the case, stated
that it would only enforce conditions causing forfeiture when
they were not contrary to public policy. The court, however,
drew a distinction between "conditions" and "exclusions" and
found that exclusions were not forfeitures and, therefore, would
1-4 See id.
105 237 Cal. Rptr. 632 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987).
106 See id. at 632-33.
107 See id. at 633.
108 See id. at 635-36.
109 763 P.2d 246 (Ariz. 1988).
110 See id. at 249. In fact, a physician actually provided unrefuted evidence indi-
cating the pilot was in excellent health, both physically and mentally, at the time
of the accident. See Security Ins. Co. v. Andersen, 763 P.2d 246, 251, 255 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1986), rev'd, 763 P.2d 246 (Ariz. 1988).
"I See Security Ins., 763 P.2d at 251.
112 See id. at 260-61.
113 Id. at 261.
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not be struck down unless they were unconscionable.114 The
court reasoned that it would uphold such exclusions only if they
were specific. In other words, broad exclusions denying cover-
age when the aircraft is operated in violation of any FAR would
render the policy illusory and would be unconscionable because
most accidents involve at least one FAR violation." 5 Specific ex-
clusions such as the one at issue, however, would be upheld.' 6
The Security Insurance decision begs the question whether
specificity alone is enough to prevent an exclusion from being
unconscionable. For example, an exclusion that denies cover-
age for accidents occurring on Wednesdays is specific-
although the application of this exclusion would be extremely
arbitrary. In a similar context, a Texas court defined the term
unconscionable quite differently when it addressed aircraft in-
surance policy provisions. That court stated that "unconsciona-
ble""' 7 is simply the denial of coverage for the breach of a policy
provision that contributes in no way to the loss.
The states that allow insurers to deny coverage for these types
of technical breaches seem to justify their position based upon
the nature of an exclusion. The rationale is that because an ex-
clusion defines what lies outside the policy, giving affect to an
exclusion does not have to meet the contribute-to-the-loss stan-
dard that warranties for coverage within the policy must meet.
One constant theme, which runs throughout these cases, is that
the particular cause of the loss that the insurer sought to exclude
was totally irrelevant to the covered cause that actually occurred.
The next section contains cases with factual scenarios similar to
those discussed above, but in which courts apply a contribute-to-
the-loss standard. By applying this standard, the courts did not
allow the insurers to hide behind arbitrary provisions to deny
coverage in such cases.
V. CONTRIBUTE-TO-THE-LOSS STANDARD (DOCTRINE)
The following cases illustrate that states disfavoring technical
breaches do not give exclusions treatment distinct from that
given warranties. Just because a contribute-to-the-loss standard
is adopted in a given case does not, however, mean that the in-
sured is guaranteed coverage. This is because most states place
114 See Security Ins., 763 P.2d at 250.
115 See id. at 250-51.
116 See id. at 250.
17 See Puckett v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 678 S.W.2d 936, 938 (Tex. 1984).
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the burden on the insured to prove the breach did not contrib-
ute to the loss. Therefore, regardless of whether or not the loss
is related to the breach, if the insured cannot meet its burden of
proof, no coverage is provided.
A. APPLYING THE CONTRIBUTE-TO-THE-LOSS STANDARD
In Bayers v. Omni Aviation Managers, Inc.," 8 the insurer denied
coverage because the pilot's medical certificate had expired two
months before the accident. 119 Because the pilot's health was in
no way related to the accident,12 the court allowed coverage. It
reasoned that "[t]o deny the insured the coverage he had paid
for where merely a technical breach occurred would be un-
fair."'1 21 The court added that the insurer has the ability to
guard against the risk of loss arising from a pilot in bad health,
however, the pilot's lack of a medical certificate in the case at
issue did not increase the insurer's risk at all.122 In following
what it called the "trend of modern authority" the court took
note of two similar cases 23 that also required a causal connec-
tion between the breach of a policy provision and the loss.' 24 In
noting that the majority of other decisions were to the contrary,
the court stated that only their number, not their reasoning, lends
support to the insurer's position. 12
Similarly, in South Carolina Insurance Guaranty Ass'n v.
Broach,'26 a student pilot had an accident during a solo flight not
specifically approved by the instructor. 27 Although the student
was licensed to fly solo, flights not specifically authorized by a
118 510 F. Supp. 1204 (Mont. 1981).
119 See id. at 1206.
120 The aircraft crashed into an oil tank at a petroleum refinery immediately
after takeoff. The aircraft was destroyed and the pilot was killed. See id. at 1205.
121 Id. at 1207.
122 See id.
123 See, e.g., South Carolina Ins. Co. v. Collins, 237 S.E.2d 358 (S.C. 1977)
(holding coverage cannot be denied when there is no causal connection between
the accident and the insured's lack of medical certificate); Avemco Ins. Co. v.
Chung, 388 F. Supp. 142 (D. Haw. 1975) (ruling insured's failure to possess a
current medical certificate would not void coverage unless such failure caused
the loss).
124 See Bayers, 510 F. Supp. at 1207.
125 See id. (citing South Carolina Ins. Co. v. Collins, 237 S.E.2d 358, 362 (S.C.
1977)).
126 353 S.E.2d 450 (S.C. 1987).
127 See id. at 451.
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flight instructor were excluded from coverage. 128 Embracing
the modern trend, the court held that the insurer could deny
coverage only if the breach of the policy provision contributed
to the loss. Explaining the rationale of its position, the court
stated that "when the parties made the contract of insurance,
they were not inserting a mere arbitrary provision, but that it
was the purpose of the insurance company to relieve itself of
liability from accidents caused by the excluded provision." '129
The insurer in Pickett v. Woods' denied coverage when the
insured crashed his aircraft during an attempted landing in bad
weather. 131 The court based its denial upon a policy exclu-
sion' 1 2 for failure to have an annual inspection performed on
the aircraft within the preceding twelve months, even though
the accident's cause was clearly pilot error. 33 The appellate
court reversed the trial court's denial of coverage by applying
the state's newly-enacted anti-technical statute.' 34 The fact that
the provision in question was an exclusion did not burden the
appellate court in its decision because it viewed warranties, con-
ditions, and exclusions as mere labels that the insurer gave to
various policy provisions.' The court reasoned that the statute
explicitly applied to all policy provisions because the statute was
"designed to prevent the insurer from avoiding coverage on a
128 See id. The relevant policy language stated that "[all] operations of an air-
craft by a student pilot must be under the direct supervision of a properly quali-
fied FAA certified flight instructor, who shall have specifically approved each
flight undertaken by the student prior to takeoff." Id.
129 Id. (quoting South Carolina Ins. Co. v. Collins, 237 S.E.2d 358, 361-62 (S.C.
1977)) (emphasis added).
130 404 So. 2d 1152 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
131 See id. at 1153.
132 The policy provision stated that coverage did not apply to any insured "who
operates or permits the operation of the aircraft, while in flight, unless its airwor-
thiness certificate is in full force and effect." Id. at 1152. Because the insured
had failed to have an annual inspection performed on the aircraft, the airworthi-
ness certificate was not in full force and effect at the time of the accident. See id.
at 1153.
133 See id. at 1153.
1-4 The Florida statute, which the Pickett Court applied, was enacted in 1979
and provides:
A breach or violation by the insured of any warranty, condition, or
provision of any wet marine or transportation insurance policy,
contract of insurance, endorsement, or application therefore shall
not render void the policy or contract, or constitute a defense to a
loss thereon, unless such breach or violation increased the hazard
by any means within the control of the insured.
Id. at 1152-53 (citing Fla. Stat. ch. 627.409(2)(1996)).
135 See id. at 1153.
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technical omission playing no part in the loss. ' 13 6 Therefore,
the appellate court remanded the case to the trial court to de-
termine whether the lack of an annual inspection was in any way
related to the lOSS. 1 3 7
In Puckett v. United States Fire Insurance Co.,13 an accident oc-
curred in which the aircraft had not had an annual inspection
within the preceding twelve months. This precluded the airwor-
thiness certificate from being in full force and effect as required
by the insurance policy. 13 9 Nevertheless, because the accident
was solely due to pilot error, the Texas Supreme Court refused
to deny coverage on a mere technicality. The court stated that
numerous maintenance requirements necessary to keep the cer-
tificate valid were so highly technical in nature that it was virtu-
ally impossible for the insured to know the status of the
certificate at any given time. 4 ° Further, the court held that to
allow the insurer to avoid liability on a technicality that does not
contribute to the loss would be unconscionable. The court con-
cluded that if it "held otherwise, it would actually be to the in-
surer's advantage that the insured failed to [have an annual
inspection]. In such event, the insurer would collect a premium
but would have no risk exposure because the policy would no
longer be effective."' 41
In American States Insurance Co. v. Byerly Aviation, Inc.,14 2 the
insurer denied coverage for an accident because the pilot flying
the aircraft was not one of the pilots named in the policy.143
Despite the fact that the crash was the result of a catastrophic
mechanical failure,'44 the insurer claimed that coverage was ex-
cluded because someone other than a named pilot flew the air-
craft. 145 Allowing coverage, the court stated that the only
136 Id.
137 See id.
138 678 S.W.2d 936 (Tex. 1984).
-3 See id. at 937.
140 See id. at 938.
141 Id. at 938 (citing Pickett v. Woods, 404 So. 2d 1152 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1981)).
142 456 F. Supp. 967 (S.D. 111. 1978).
143 See id. at 968.
144 The aircraft involved in this case was a helicopter. The accident was the
result of the main rotor became detached and caused the crash that killed the
pilot and his passenger. See id. at 967-68.
145 The relevant provision states that "[t] his policy does not apply ... while the
aircraft is in flight and . . .operated by any pilot other than as specified in the
declarations." Id. at 968. The pilot who was flying the aircraft at the time of the
accident was not one of those specified in the declarations. See id.
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reasonable purpose for the exclusion was to limit the insurer's
liability resulting from negligent, unskilled pilots, of which there
was absolutely no evidence. Conversely, the insured paid premi-
ums and the insurer agreed to cover certain risks, one of which
was loss due to mechanical failure. 146 Because the nonnamed
pilot did not prejudice the insurer, and the casualty that oc-
curred was one indeed covered under the policy, invoking such
an exclusion would provide the insurer with a "pure windfall of
non-liability.' 14 ' Finally, the court concluded that because a
causal connection is required "for coverage to be afforded
under an insuring agreement, it would seem grossly unfair not
to require such connection between the loss which occurs and
the exclusion, in order for the insurer to successfully escape cov-
erage under an exclusion." '148
Just because a state subscribes to the contribute-to-the-loss
standard does not, however, mean that the insured will prevail
on a claim for coverage that has been excluded because of the
insured's breach. In Ideal Mutual Insurance Co. v. Last Days Evan-
gelical Ass'n, Inc.,1 49 the trial court determined that the policy
provided no coverage for an accident in which the pilot lacked
the requisite number of hours that the policy required.5 0 On
appeal, the case was remanded with the burden placed on the
insured to prove that the pilot's insufficient hours did not con-
tribute to the loss.' The burden of proving that pilot error was
not the cause of the crash would have been particularly prob-
lematic for the insured because the eight-passenger aircraft was
carrying twelve people at the time of the accident.1 52
B. CASES IN WHICH COVERAGE WAS DENIED
As some of the cases in the previous section indicated, the
insured is not necessarily entitled to a smooth ride simply be-
cause a contribute-to-the-loss standard is adopted. Indeed, in
146 See id. at 970.
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 783 F.2d 1234 (5th Cir. 1986).
150 See id. at 1234.
151 See id. at 1241.
152 The insurer denied coverage alleging that the aircraft crashed as a result of
being overloaded. See id. at 1236. The damaged aircraft involved was a Cessna
414- a twin-engine aircraft capable of carrying a pilot and seven passengers. See
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the cases that follow, the insured were actually denied coverage
despite the courts' adhering to the modern trend.
In O'Connor v. Proprietors Insurance Co.,15 the insured failed to
have an annual inspection performed when due.154 But, in that
case, no evidence of the accident's cause was present. 155 Apply-
ing a contribute-to-the-loss standard, the court stated that public
policy should preclude applying safety-related policy exclusion
only when the insured can show that the violation was not a
cause of the accident. 156 Therefore, because the insured failed
to prove that the missing current annual inspection did not con-
tribute to the loss in that case, the court denied coverage.
Accordingly, in Gardner Trucking Co. v. South Carolina Insurance
Guaranty Ass'n, 1 5 the South Carolina Supreme Court upheld
two policy exclusions that denied coverage. In Gardner, one ex-
clusion provided that the aircraft was not to be flown unless the
airworthiness certificate1 58 was in full force and effect.159 Be-
cause an annual inspection 6 ' had not been performed on the
aircraft within the preceding twelve months,16 that provision
was violated. 16 2 Despite the fact that the annual inspection had
153 696 P.2d 282 (Colo. 1985).
154 See id. at 284. Although fifteen months had elapsed since the last annual
inspection, less than twelve months had passed since the last 100-hour inspection,
which is an identical inspection. See id. at 283-84. The insured unsuccessfully
argued that the denial of coverage due to the language of the logbook entry
denoting the inspection as a "100-hour" rather than an "annual" inspection was
based upon a mere technicality. See id. at 284. The primary distinction between
these two types of inspections is in the person authorized to perform them. See
id. at 283. A person holding an airframe and powerplant (A&P) mechanic li-
cense may perform a 100-hour inspection, however, an A&P mechanic that, in
addition, holds an FAA Inspection Authorization (IA) must perform an annual
inspection. The FAA imposes special knowledge and experience requirements
on IA applicants which are over and above those required for A&P mechanics.
See id. at 285. IA requirements are more fully specified in 14 C.F.R. § 65.91
(1997). See id.
155 See id. at 284.
156 See id. at 286.
157 376 S.E.2d 260 (S.C. 1989).
158 See supra notes 47.
159 See Gardner, 376 S.E.2d at 261-62.
160 See supra note 61.
161 The FARs provide that "no person may operate an aircraft unless, within
the preceding 12 calendar months, it has had ... [a]n annual inspection in
accordance with part 43 of this chapter and has been approved for return to
service by a person authorized by § 43.7 of this chapter." 14 C.F.R.
§ 91.409(a)(1) (1997).
162 The FARs provide that an airworthiness certificate is only effective "as long
as the maintenance, preventive maintenance, and alternations are performed in
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not been performed within the required time period, the owner
in Gardner allowed the aircraft to be flown, at which time the
landing gear malfunctioned on landing and damaged the
aircraft. 163
Obviously, the primary purpose of aircraft inspection is to de-
tect and prevent mechanical malfunctions. During an annual
inspection, an aircraft with retractable landing gear is placed on
jacks to facilitate a thorough inspection of the landing gear sys-
tem. In addition to checking the landing gear's normal opera-
tion, the inspector operates the emergency extension system to
ensure a backup means of extension is available if necessary. 164
In Gardner, the court upheld the exclusion not only because it
was valid, but also because the insured offered no proof that the
failure to properly maintain the aircraft did not contribute to
the loss. 165
The second exclusion that the Gardner court upheld dealt
with pilot qualifications. The policy provided that no coverage
was available unless the pilot had a minimum of 150 hours flying
aircraft with retractable landing gear and twenty-five hours in
the same make and model as the insured aircraft. 66 These re-
quirements directly relate to the risk the insurer assumed, be-
cause the more experience a pilot has with retractable landing
gear equipped aircraft, the better he is able to cope with landing
gear malfunctions and other related emergency situations while
flying that type of aircraft.'67 Notwithstanding the minimum
time requirement, the pilot in Gardner had only thirty hours of
retractable time and only ten hours in the same make and
model as the insured aircraft. 6 8 Regarding this exclusion, the
insured did not dispute that the pilot's lack of experience was
causally connected to the loss.169
Likewise, policy exclusions that deny coverage if the pilot is
not properly rated for the existing flight conditions also serve
the valid purpose of limiting the insurer's risk. Illustrative evi-
dence of this point is National Insurance Underwriters v. Mark,7 °
accordance with Parts 43 and 91 of this chapter." 14 C.F.R. § 21.181(a)(1)
(1998).
163 See Gardner, 376 S.E.2d at 236.
164 See 14 C.F.R. Pt. 43, App. D (e) (1998).
165 See Gardner, 376 S.E.2d at 238.
166 See id. at 261.
167 See, e.g., SPEISER supra note 3, § 22:5 at 20.
168 See Gardner 376 S.E.2d at 262.
169 See id.
170 704 F. Supp. 1033 (D. Colo. 1989).
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which deals with an accident involving a VFR-rated1 7 1 pilot at-
tempting to operate an aircraft in IFR 172 conditions, for which
he was not qualified. 73 In the National Insurance case, the pilot
and his passenger were both killed when the pilot attempted to
takeoff in poor weather conditions, which included one-quarter
mile visibility and indefinite ceilings due to fog. 174 Denying cov-
erage, the United States District Court stated that the policy ex-
clusion was clearly safety related and not contrary to public
policy. 175 In light of the weather conditions, which demanded
skills beyond those that the pilot possessed, the court did not
view the operation of the pilot certification exclusion as a mere
technical breach. 176 Despite applying a contribute-to-the-loss
standard, the court denied coverage.
These cases demonstrate that applying a contribute-to-the-loss
standard can reconcile the interests of both the insurer and the
insured. The insurance policy for which the insured has paid
will provide coverage for losses as long as such losses are the
result of a covered risk. Conversely, the risks the insurer seeks
to avoid through the use of valid exclusions will deny coverage if
the forbidden activity causes a loss, thereby serving the exclu-
sion's purpose.
171 VFR, or Visual Flight Rules, are "[r]ules that govern the procedures for
conducting flight under visual conditions. The term 'VFR' is also used in the
United States to indicate weather conditions that are equal to or greater than
minimum VFR requirements." U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., FED. AVIATION ADMIN., AIR-
MAN'S INFORMATION MANUAL, PILOT/CONTROLLER GLOSSARY, V-2, V-3 (1995)
[hereinafter AIM]. Basic VFR weather minimums are detailed in the FARs and
generally prohibit flight unless minimum visibility and distance from clouds can
be maintained. See 14 C.F.R. § 91.155 (1997). In essence, these regulations limit
pilots, without an instrument rating, to flight conditions in which control and
navigation of the aircraft can be accomplished primarily by visual ground
references.
172 IFR, or Instrument Flight Rules, are "[a] set of rules governing the conduct
of flight under instrument meteorological conditions." AIM 1-2. Instrument me-
teorological conditions are further defined as "[m]eteorological conditions ex-
pressed in terms of visibility, distance from cloud, and ceiling less than the
minima specified for visual meteorological conditions." Id. at 1-2, 1-3. Flight in
"instrument" conditions require the pilot to control and navigate the aircraft
solely by reference to the aircraft instruments and avionics and are therefore
restricted to pilots who have had additional training and hold an Instrument
Rating. See generally 14 C.F.R. § 61.55 (1997) (setting out specific training
requirements).
173 See National Ins., 704 F. Supp. at 1034.
174 See id.
175 See id. at 1035.
176 See id.
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C. BURDEN OF PROOF
Most of the states, which have adopted the contribute-to-the-
loss standard, have placed the burden on the insured to prove
that the breach was not related to the loss. If the insured cannot
prove beyond a preponderance of the evidence that the breach
did not cause the accident, then coverage is denied. Similarly, if
the cause of the accident remains unknown, the insured is un-
able to sustain the burden of proof and no coverage is provided.
Texas and South Carolina have, however, elected to place the
burden of proof on the insurer in all such contribute-to-the-loss
cases. 177
D. PUBLIC POLICY
A common proposition is that "[i] t is the fundamental right
of the insurer to decide what it will and what it will not insure
against, providing that the provision is not against public pol-
icy. "17s In the aviation context, however, policy provisions that
deny coverage for a single violation of the voluminous FARs may
indeed violate public policy. The reason is that such provisions,
in effect, allow the insurer to receive premiums when it is not
incurring any realistic risk of liability.179
Insurance companies have a valid reason to promote adher-
ence to FARs when violations would increase their risks. That is
not, however, the primary purpose of aircraft insurance poli-
cies; their primary purpose is to provide coverage when no cov-
erage otherwise exists. The FAA's primary function is to
promote and enforce FARs. Insurers should be commended for
promoting adherence to FARs by aviators, especially when such
promotion is done in conjunction with limiting their own liabil-
ity for losses that result from violations. But for situations in
which the violation does not contribute to the loss, that motive
should not overshadow the basic purpose of insurance-to pro-
vide coverage when no coverage exists.
177 See, e.g., Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Burts Bros., Inc., 744 S.W.2d 219 (holding
that a pilot's lack of flight experience must be causally connected to the accident
before exclusion can deny coverage); South Carolina Ins. Guaranty Ass'n v.
Broach, 353 S.E.2d 450 (S.C. 1987) (holding that an exclusion denying coverage
for a student pilot not flying under the direct supervision of flight instructor must
be causally connected to crash).
178 O'Connor v. Proprietors Ins. Co., 696 P.2d 282, 285 (Colo. 1985) (quoting
Royal Indem. Co. v. John F. Cawrse Lumber Co., 245 F. Supp. 707, 710 (D. Or.
1965)).
179 See O'Connor, 696 P.2d at 285.
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VI. CONCLUSION
In the past, insurance companies utilized warranties, repre-
sentations, and conditions to protect themselves against certain
risks. When insureds breached these provisions, insurers did
not have to pay, regardless of whether the breach was material
or contributed to the loss. Then states enacted contribute-to-
the-loss statutes to counter the harsh result of forfeiture when the
loss was unrelated to the provision breach. In the aviation insur-
ance industry, insurers have sought to avoid the contribute-to-
the-loss standard by labeling some of these same policy provi-
sions as exclusions. By doing so, insurers argue that coverage was
not forfeited due to the breach because coverage never existed
for the excluded activity.
Not surprisingly, claims that the aircraft never had coverage
are puzzling. Obviously, if the premium has been paid and a
policy has been issued, some coverage must have resulted. After
the policy has been issued, the aircraft undoubtedly has cover-
age while it is sitting static on the ramp. Therefore, the aircraft
should remain covered unless that coverage is forfeited for some
reason, i.e., through the insured's operating the aircraft for an
excluded use. It is true that some uses or events may be ex-
cluded from coverage from the policy's and particular coverage
cannot be forfeited because it never existed. If the exclusion is
given effect, however, the valid coverage on the aircraft that ex-
isted before the breach is forfeited.
The contribute-to-the-loss standard is the fairest solution to
the dilemma regarding aircraft insurance claims. The cases in
which this modern trend was applied clearly did not prejudice
the interests of either party. When an insured breaches a policy
provision and a loss occurs, the insurer is not prejudiced if the
evidence proves that the breachwas related to the loss because
no coverage will be provided. Additionally, the insurer is not
prejudiced if the cause of the loss remains unknown, because no
coverage is provided since the insured failed to prove its case. If
the insured successfully proves that the policy provision breach
was totally unrelated to the loss, then the exclusion and the pur-
pose it serves become irrelevant. No prejudice results to either
party applying this modern standard, unless the insurer's inter-
ests are prejudiced by limiting its ability to arbitrarily avoid pay-
ing certain claims.
Certainly a pilot is negligent if he forgets to renew his medical
certificate or have an annual inspection when due, but these
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events only occur every two years and one year respectively.
Therefore, it is not so unusual that the insured might forget
these events at one point or another. After all, the precise rea-
son for which insurance is purchased is to protect the insured,
as well as others, from the occasional negligent acts of the
insured.
